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Abstract 
In this thesis we look at 'the solution to the German code machine, the Enigma 
machine. This solution was originally found by Polish cryptologists. We look at the 
solution from a historical perspective, but most importantly, from a mathematical 
point of view. Although there are no complete records of the Polish solution, we try 
to reconstruct what was done, sometimes filling in blanks, and sometimes finding 
a more mathematical way than was originally found. We also look at whether the 
solution would have been possible without the help of information obtained from a 
German spy. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The Enigma Machine was a German code machine from World War II. It was used 
by all sections of the German military, in sometimes differing forms, both before 
and during the war. The Germans believed that it was completely unbreakable, and 
though they sometimes changed the setup of the machine to foil any such attempt, 
they never really thought that anyone could do it. 
The Polish cryptographers who solved the Enigma machine code were some of the 
first cryptographers who were mathematicians, not just able to work with languages. 
They, among others, were chosen to take a class at their university in Poznan, and 
eventually they became the core of Poland's decryptment team. Their skills with 
math enabled them to solve the Enigma using Algebra, mostly Group Theory. 
One of the biggest controversies surrounding this issue is whether the solution of 
the Enigma code would have been possible without the help of a German spy. 
He supplied the French, and through them, the Poles, with information that was 
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critical in the solution of the Enigma. What remains a mystery is if another method 
could have been found to decrypt the code, and whether it would have been found 
in time, particularly without the computing tools of today. 
Chapter 2 
The History 
2.1 Before The Enigma 
It all started in January 1929, when Professor Zdzislaw Krygowski of the Mathe-
matics Institute of Poland's Poznan University chose a group of third and fourth 
year students to be given the chance to participate in a cryptology course. The 
students were chosen based on their academic record, and their ability to speak 
German. The course was organized by two members of the Polish General Staff 
in Warsaw, Major Franciszek Pokorny and Lieutenant Maksymilian Ci(lzki, and 
conducted by Cipher Bureau cryptologists from Warsaw. About twenty students 
decided to take the class, held in the evenings, twice a week, and were consequently 
sworn to secrecy. [5, page 1] 
The class was started because of the need for more cryptologists in Poland. The 
Polish believed (correctly) that the German army was about to be greatly expanded. 
3 
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The Germans were also advertising that they "[intended] to take away from Poland 
the 'lost territories' in the east: Pomerania, western Poland, Upper Silesia". [5, 
page 2] In order to keep up with military developments, it was necessary to mon-
itor German military radio stations, and to decrypt the messages collected from 
this venture. Unfortunately, there were only about five people in Poland at the 
time who specialized in cryptology, and thus much of the radio traffic was going 
undeciphered. Thus many more trained specialists were needed. 
Poznan was chosen as the location for the class because of the students. They were 
mostly from western Poland and had, because of the recent occupations by Prussia 
and Germany of that area, attended German-language schools. This, combined 
with their knowledge of Mathematics, made them ideal candidates to increase the 
number of cryptologists. 
The course included not only instruction, but also real-life examples, which became 
more difficult as the course progressed. These were used to test the students, to see 
if they were capable of learning this kind of applied, high pressure mathematics. 
Many found that they were not, and dropped the course either because they didn't 
have the talent or the ability for learning the material, and others because they 
couldn't keep up with the pace of the course. Among the few who were able to stay 
with the course were Marian Rejewski, Henryk Zygalski, and Jerzy Rozycki. These 
three were to later form the basis for the Polish contributions to the solution of the 
Enigma. 
Between 1929 and 1930, the three students had gone their separate ways, but in 
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the fall of 1930 they were all working for the Cipher Bureau in an underground 
laboratory in Poznan. It had been organized so that students could keep up with 
their classes, but still spend their free time deciphering intercepted German radio-
grams. They were not only able to work at any time of the day or night, but also 
the lab was "literally but a few paces" [5, page 6] from the Mathematics Institute. 
They were also given total seclusion and security, with passes being required at the 
entrance. 
The goal of this lab was not to do the deciphering itself, but to "[work] out methods 
of breaking the German cipher keys." [5, page 6] The codes at first were relatively 
straightforward to solve, but eventually became extremely difficult, unlike anything 
they had seen before. These difficult codes were later known to be the work of the 
Enigma machine. When attempting to break the codes, they, in addition to us-
ing the usual mathematical methods, "[exploited] mistakes made by the German 
cipher clerks". [5, page 6] These included the padding out of short messages with 
the letter X in order to make fifty letters [5, page 6], and later, for the Enigma 
codes, the use of repeated letters, letters physically consecutive on the German 
typewriter keyboard, and letters located consecutively in the alphabet as message 
keys [1, pages 17 - 18](see Section 4.2). 
In the summer of 1932, the Cipher Bureau branch at Poznan was closed, and the 
students, now specialists, currently working there were moved to the main Cipher 
Bureau branch in Warsaw, where they continued working on the non-Enigma codes. 
The core of this team was Rejewski, Zygalski, and Rozycki. They each had diverse 
characteristics which contributed to their eventual successes: Marian Rejewski's 
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penetrating mind and skill in formulating questions and advancing far-reaching 
hypotheses from scarce information were supported by the precision, energy, and 
perseverance ofHenryk Zygalski, while Jerzy Rozycki contributed elements of vivid 
imagination and intuition. [5, page 9] 
These traits, along with their training and experience, enabled them, with some 
external assistance, to do what no other group would be able to do for some years: 
solve the Enigma code. 
2.2 The Enigma In Poland 
The Enigma Machine first went into service with the German army on July 15, 
1928. [4, page 41] Because the codes seemed more like gibberish than encrypted 
communications, the Poles at first thought that they were broadcast only to con-
fuse and waste the time of the people monitoring and attempting to decrypt the 
German radio traffic. [5, page 6] As these new codes became more and more fre-
quent, eventually almost replacing all other codes, this possibility grew increasingly 
unlikely. 
The Enigma codes were different from those encountered previously in that the 
distribution of letters appeared to be too regular, and there were no repetitions of 
groupings of letters. Because of this, "the usual statistical and linguistic methods 
would be useless." [5, page 12] Thus, a new technique for code breaking had to be 
developed. 
This task fell at first to Rejewski. In the winter of 1932, he was asked to work on 
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his own, in the afternoons when the others of his group would not be around, on 
the Enigma code. His first important discovery was that it was a machine code. 
The second was the significance of.the first six letters of any message. This led to 
the first step in solving the Enigma: finding the message key. 
Once these first discoveries were made, Rejewski was supplied with a commercial 
Enigma machine. This machine was not identical to the military one, but had 
enough similarities, such as the reversing drum, that it gave Rejewski a feel for 
what he was trying to do. He was also required to extend his time working on the 
Enigma from just two hours in the afternoon to seven hours, and he was given a 
separate room for this work. [5, page 233] 
At this point, Rejewski's work, now with algebraic equations involving several un-
knowns, came to a halt. He found that without further information, it would be 
very difficult to continue. Fortuitously, help came at just the right time. 
2.3 The Spy 
Thought by many, but not ail, to be the biggest single break in the solution of the 
Enigma, was the intelligence supplied by a German working in the Reichswehr's 
Cryptographic Agency. In October 1932, the man contacted a French intelligence 
officer and offered information in exchange for payment. At first it was thought that 
this man was an impostor, but upon receiving some of the proffered documentation, 
and verifying its authenticity, they realized that they had a genuine source of much 
needed data. This "newly recruited agent received the pseudonym 'Asche"', [5, 
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page 17] and supplied important documentation on both the Enigma code, and 
others currently in use by the Germans. 
At this same time, the chief of French radio intelligence, Captain Gustave Bertrand, 
decided that "of the possible allies, the Poles had the best chance of success" [5, page 
16] in the matter of the Enigma. Because of this, the information on the Enigma 
obtained by Asche was shared with the Poles. The first meeting between the two 
took place from December 7th to 11th in Warsaw. At the meeting, Bertrand, 
and his equivalent in the Polish Cipher Bureau, Major Gwido Langer, decided to 
distribute the tasks necessary to break the Enigma. 
The French were to concentrate on furnishing intelligence from Germany that 
might facilitate the breaking of the machine cipher, [ and] the Poles on the 
theoretical studies of Enigma intercepts. Procedures were set up for exchange 
of German radio intercepts, radiogoniometric data, and other intelligence. It 
was also decided to establish closer ties with the corresponding unit of the 
Czechoslovak General Staff, thereby creating a triple entente of cryptological 
services. [5, pages 18 - 19] 
Thus, the cooperative efforts that eventually allowed the solution to the Enigma 
to be used in practice, and to affect the war effort, were begun. 
The documents received from Asche and passed on to the Poles included "operating 
instructions for the cipher machine, keying instructions and obsolete tables of daily 
keys for September and October 1932" [5, page 19] although other documents may 
have been passed on as well. These documents, especially the tables of daily keys, 
were pivotal in Rejewski's solution of the Enigma (see Section 4.3.2) although may 
not have actually been necessary ( see Chapter 5). The operating instructions also 
helped, by alerting the Poles to the existence of the plugboard. 
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It is evident that the information Asche provided was very helpful to Marian Re-
jewski in his solution of the Enigma. What remains to be shown is whether this 
information was completely necessary: that is, could the Enigma have been solved 
without it, and if so, could it have been solved as quickly? This issue will be 
addressed in Chapter 5. 
2.4 The Breakthrough 
Once the information for the spy was utilized, the final step in the solution of the 
Enigma was not long to come. The chief breakthrough came in the final days of 
December 1932. The practical reading of messages began during the second ten 
days of January. Success, once again, could not have been mcire timely. Just under 
way in Germany was the Nazi campaign that on the thirtieth of January 1933 
would deliver power into Hitler's hands. Neither the French, nor the British, as 
it later turned out, despite their long-standing traditions of black chambers with 
experienced cryptological teams and large financial outlays, managed to solve the 
German cipher system. [5, page 21] 
By the end of 1932, Rejewski had almost succeeded in solving the Enigma, and 
actually had a solution that he believed to be correct, until an application of it 
proved that there must be an error. Until this time, he had been assuming that 
the entry drum was the same as that in the commercial Enigma machine, that "the 
letters of the alphabet were represented on the circumference of the entry [drum] in 
the same order in which they appeared on a German typewriter keyboard" [5, page 
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20]. Since this was the only unfounded assumption made to this point, it must be 
the mistake, and thus another assumption must be made. Rejewski's wild guess, 
that the letters were in alphabetical order on the entry drum, turned out to be 
correct, and thus they were able to read the Enigma code. 
2.5 Mechanizing the Process 
After the final breakthrough, other steps could be taken to facilitate the reading 
~f coded messages. These included the building of doubles of the military Enigma, 
and the invention of several devices: the cyclometer, the clock, the bomb, and some 
special perforated sheets. 
Marian Rejewski contributed the cyclometer, which "enabled the cryptologist to set 
up a catalogue of possible settings of the rotors" which "gave much faster recovery 
of the [daily] keys." [5, page 29] The clock, a device "which made it possible in 
certain cases to determine which rotor was at the far right side on a given day in 
a given Enigma net" [5, page 29], was from Jerzy Rozycki. In 1938, the bomb was 
invented by all three Polish cryptologists. It was a device made from six Enigmas, 
and could find, within two hours, the daily keys, with almost no effort, after initial 
startup, from the cryptologists. At the same time, the final invention, almost 
completely that of Henryk Zygalski, was "a special series of [twenty-six] perforated 
paper sheets with a capacity of fifty-one holes by fifty-one" was used to "[break] 
the doubly enciphered individual message keys" [5, page 54]. 
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2.6 Leaving Poland 
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On the first of September, 1939, the invasion of Poland by the Germans began. By 
the fifth, Poland's situation had deteriorated so much that the Cipher Bureau was 
ordered to destroy some files, pack up the apparatus and remaining files, and load 
the material and themselves on a train headed to Warsaw's Wilno Station, where 
they would then get on a train headed to Brzesc, the new location of the supreme 
headquarters. Once they reached that destination, a new one was proposed, and 
Bureau personnel now headed south, by truck, after convincing the stage mas-
ter that "the heavy green crates [containing important decryption equipment that 
could not fall into enemy hands] were more important than the luggage of civil-
ian dignitaries" [5, page 71]. Along the way, their evacuation orders became more 
specific, and they headed for Rumania. On September 17th, the cryptologists and 
other personnel, with the one truck and the little equipment that remained after 
lack of fuel had gradually whittled down the number of vehicles that could keep 
moving, crossed into Rumania. 
At this point, military and civilian personnel were sent in different directions. Re-
jewski, Rozycki, and Zygalski, fearing that they could be identified by German 
informers in the camp they were being sent to, ignored their orders. They headed 
past the camp, and straight to a railroad station, where they purchased tickets, 
and headed south as quickly as possible, this time to Bucharest. There, the war 
was much less evident, and they were able to contact the military attache at the 
Polish Embassy. While military personnel and government dignitaries were much 
more important than three apparent civilians, the attache found time to speak with 
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them, and suggested that they go to the French or British Embassy. 
The three cryptologists first went to the British Embassy, but when they were 
told they would have to wait, tried the French. As soon as they explained why 
they were there, and mentioned the name "Bolek", the pseudonym of the French 
radio-intelligence chief Gustave Bertrand, Paris was contacted and the staff of the 
Embassy was instructed "to assist the Polish cryptologists in leaving at once for 
France." [5, page 73] Bertrand had been waiting to contact the Poles since their 
departure from Warsaw. In less than two days, the cryptologists were supplied 
passports, transit visas, and were on their way to France. 
2.7 In France 
After reaching Paris, Rejewski, Rozycki, and Zygalski spent a few days on formali-
ties and meeting with Bertrand's organization. At this time, Bertrand himself was 
in Rumania, attempting "to secure the release from internment camps of officer 
and civilian workers of the Polish" [5, page 75] Cipher Bureau. He returned shortly 
after, followed by the Cipher Bureau personnel. 
At this time, the French government and military were irritated by the Polish am-
bassador and military attache. This was at least partly because the Poles were 
openly opposed to France's lack of initiative in the conflict. Instead of attacking 
the Germans, France decided to wait for the Germans at the Maginot Line. Al-
though several high ranking officers disagreed with this policy, Bertrand included, 
they were "regarded as pessimists" and forced "to follow the rapid advances of the 
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German armies through Poland on. a scrupulously maintained situation map." [5, 
page 76] 
On October 20, 1939, the Polish cryptographers "resumed their interrupted strug-
gle with the German ciphers." [5, page 81] Although the French were not actively 
engaged in war with the Germans, they still realized the importance of military 
intelligence, and allowed Major Bertrand free reign with his cipher bureau. As of 
November, the now joined French and Polish cipher bureaus moved from Paris to 
Gretz-Armainvillers, to a chateau with the code name of Bruno, which, for the 
duration of the war, "became the chief headquarters and foundation of all Allied 
radio intelligence." [5, page 83] 
The Poles had managed to bring two Enigma machines out of Poland, and these, 
as well as one they had given the French at the Warsaw conference, were at their 
disposal. They were also able to obtain the perforated sheets that were now being 
manufactured in Britain, in exchange for German Navy and Air Force signals. With 
this and other equipment, they began to reconstruct their solution to the wartime 
Enigma system, for which most documentation had been lost on the way out of 
Poland. 
The constant use of the Enigma machines was wearing the machines out. Bertrand 
thus ordered forty copies to be made, and the subsequent dismantling of one of the 
machines to copy slowed down the reading of signals. Unfortunately, the manu-
facturing proceeded very slowly, and six months later, no new machines had yet 
been received. "It was only after the fall of France in June 1940 and the opening 
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of underground work in the free zone of the south that four machine were finally 
assembled from parts produced in occupied France." [5, page 85] 
When they first arrived at Bruno, Rejewski, Rozycki, and Zygalski often worked 
sixteen or seventeen hour days. They were needed to break the daily keys, which 
normally changed shortly after midnight, so often worked from 3pm until 6 or 7 
in the morning. They were also required to decipher complete messages as they 
did not immediately "have experienced decipherers to help them." [5, page 86] At 
times, Marian Rejewski was exempted from night duty "to work on the theoretical 
and mathematical aspects of cipher breaking" [5, page 87], and producing a secret 
handbook to be used in training new workers. 
Work continued in France much like this until Germany attacked France on the 
10th of May, 1940. At this point, the Polish cryptologists were moved back to 
Paris. This attack was a surprise for the French "not because of lack of warning to 
the Allies, but because of a lack of belief by the French High Command" [5, page 
105]. This was not the only such occasion on which the cryptologists were ignored. 
On June 3rd, 1940, Paris was bombed, but though more than sufficient warning 
had been given, nothing was done to counter the attack. 
2.8 After the Occupation of France 
As the Germans grew closer to Paris, plans were made to move the staff of Bruno 
out of harms way. They were slowly moved through the south of France, until an 
armistice was signed between France and Germany. Bertrand, however, was not 
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in favour of working with the Germans, and immediately moved his staff to North 
Africa. Their final destination was Algeria. 
Once things had calmed down in France, but before the new regime had com-
pletely taken control, Bertrand started making arrangements for continuing with 
decryption. He felt that the best location to do this would be inside France. The 
occupation posed a problem, while at the same time working in their favour as 
many more messages could be intercepted, including those "supplied by members 
of the resistance movement working in the French postal system." [5, page 113]. It 
was decided that the cryptologists would continue working in the unoccupied part 
of France. 
When they returned to France, however, it was discovered that, "in the interim, the 
Germans had once again changed the procedure for transmitting message keys." [5, 
page 270] After this point, the Polish cryptologists ceased to work on the Enigma 
code, and left that work to those better positioned and with more resources, the 
British. The Poles instead worked on deciphering other codes, where their experi-
ence and skills could be of some use. 
In November, 1942, the Allies landed in North Africa, and the Germans moved into 
the unoccupied zone of France. [5, page 270] Then, says Marian Rejewski, 
Major Bertrand quickly evacuated us all to the Cote d'Azur in order to 
organize our transfer in small groups across the Pyrenees into Spain, and 
on to Great Britain. However, not all the expeditions turned out happily. 
In crossing the Spanish border, Lieutenant Colonel Langer, Major Ci~zki, 
and engineer Palluth fell into the hands of the Germans. Palluth died on 
19 April 1944 in a forced-labour camp when he was struck by a fragment 
of an Allied bomb dropped during an air raid on the camp. Lieutenant 
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Colonel Langer, Major Ci~zki were put into prisoner-of-war camps, from 
which they were liberated by the Allies only in May 1945. Jerzy Rozycki had 
died earlier, on 9 January 1942, in the wreck of a ship that was carrying him 
across the Mediterranean. Thus, only Henryk Zygalski and I reached Great 
Britain. There, inducted into the Polish Army, we worked for a time at 
solving German Ciphers (but not the Enigma Cipher) until, under the terms 
of the pertinent Soviet-British agreement, our small unit was disbanded. 
[5, page 270] 
16 
After the war, Zygalski became a lecturer at the Battersea Technical College in 
England. Rejewski, not in good health, held administrative jobs in the business 
sector, until retirement. Neither cryptologist received much in the way of recogni-
tion until thirty years later, when Gustave Bertrand, among others, made public 
their accomplishments. Marian Rejewski "gave unstintingly of his time to all who 
wished to know ... about his achievements and those of his colleagues." [5, page 
225] Henryk Zygalski died near Plymouth in 1978, and Rejewski in February 1980, 
at his home in Warsaw. 
After their deaths, the cryptologists became the heroes of a Polish movie, Sekret 
Enigmy, and a television series. They also became the subjects of a stamp, the first 
to recognize the achievements of cryptologists. 
2.9 Contributions of the British and the French 
Often the British are credited with the complete solution of the Enigma. While we 
know that the Polish actually found the solutions to the earlier incarnations of the 
Enigma, the British contributions should not be ignored. Because so much of the 
British military was based in their Air Force and Navy, their communication and 
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decryption services were heavily emphasized. Thus, these services had access to 
more qualified personnel, technical resources, and money, than those of any other 
country. [5, page 95] 
Although they never managed to solve the Enigma on their own, they were able 
to take the solution and find better ways to utilize it, and to change it to keep up 
with the German changes. They could put money and manufacturing into making 
more Enigma copies, as well as the other tools the Poles had developed. They were 
also able to create better tools, even going so far as to invent one of the earliest 
computers in the process. In summary, the British were able to turn the solution 
into a viable and efficient system of decryption. 
The French contribution also cannot be overlooked. They gave the Poles a place to 
work and resources to call upon, as well as a measure of security, after they were 
forced out of Poland. They also acted as a conduit for relations between the Poles 
and the other Allied countries. The most important contribution of the French to 
the Enigma effort, however, was the information they received from the spy, Asche, 
and passed on to the Poles. 
Thus we can see that although the Polish actually initially solved the Enigma, they 
should not be alone in getting credit for it. Without the assistance of the French, 
they would not have been able to find a solution as quickly, if at all. Without the 
British, the solution would have been of much less use, and would not have been 
able to stay current with the many changes the Germans were making to their 
encryption processes. 
Chapter 3 
The Machine 
3.1 The Invention 
The Enigma code machine was invented in 1918 by Arthur Scherbius, an electri-
cal engineer [4, page 31]. It was initially rejected by both the German navy and 
Foreign Office, so Scherbius turned to the commercial market. The Enigma began 
production in 1923, but remained unprofitable until the end of 1924 [4, page 38]. 
The navy, however, were now looking for a new code system, as it had been dis·cov-
ered "that the British had been reading coded German naval messages for much of 
World War I" [4, page 38]. After looking into a variety of machines, they decided 
on Scherbius' Enigma. In 1925, production of the naval Enigma began [4, page 
40] and by 1926, the navy had enough to put them into service. In 1928 the army 
began using a slightly altered version. [4, page 41] 
We shall deal mostly with the army Enigma, as that is the machine that the Polish 
18 
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solved. It was a little less complicated than the naval machine, although it even-
tually attained some of the other machine's characteristics. They both contained 
much of the same parts, most significantly the rotors, which were the basis of the 
new encryption method. 
3.2 A Description 
The Enigma machine looked, from the outside, like a combination of a typewriter 
and a cash register (see Figure B.l on page 72). It consisted of a keyboard, a 
plugboard, an entry rotor or drum, three moving rotors, a reflector or reversing 
drum, and a lampboard. A current would flow from the keyboard, through the 
plug board, the entry drum, and the three rotors, be turned by the reflector, and go 
back through the rotors, entry drum, and plugboard, and light up the lampboard. 
3.2.1 The Keyboard and Lampboard 
The keyboard and the lampboard were the input and output mechanisms of the 
Enigma machine. The keyboard was a standard typewriter keyboard on which the 
encrypter would type his message. The lampboard was a set of 26 lights located 
above the keyboard. When an input letter was encoded, the output letter would 
light up on the lampboard. A printer was originally used, but that made the 
machine much too big and cumbersome. 
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3.2.2 The Plugboard 
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The plugboard "consisted of a plate with twenty-six sockets, each representing 
a letter, that could be connected to one another by short cables with jacks on 
the end." [4, page 41] (see Figure B.1 on page 72) The plugboard was connected 
to both the keyboard and the lamp board so that the current ( and thus the code) 
traveled through the plug board at the beginning and end of the encryption, making 
decryption by the same method possible. When the Enigma was first put into use, 
six pairs of letters were always connected, but as the war continued, this number 
was increased, and a range of numbers of connections was available. 
3.2.3 The Entry Drum 
The entry drum was essentially the connection from the plugboard to the moving 
rotors. It was stationary, and was actually eventually discovered to take each letter 
to itself. It was, therefore, not a factor in the final Enigma solution. 
3.2.4 The Rotors 
The rotors were the most significant part of the Enigma machine. They were what 
set it apart from all other codes before this time. They allow the Enigma machine 
to be more than a simple substitution code. The three rotors were placed side 
by side in the machine. The order of the rotors, and their initial rotation, were 
changed periodically, making the Enigma even harder to solve. 
An Enigma rotor is a disk somewhat smaller than a hockey puck. It has 26 electrical 
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contacts evenly spaced around its circumference, usually made of brass. Inside, each 
contact on one side of the rotor is connected to a contact on the other side, in a 
random manner (See Figure B.2 on page 73). Every machine was supplied with a 
set of rotors with identical connections. These connections, which we will call the 
rotor configuration, are the building blocks of the Enigma code. [4, page 31-32] 
The three rotors are placed in the machine in a previously specified way. Each 
time a letter is input, the first rotor turns one position. Each time the first rotor 
passes a specific letter or position, the second rotor turns one position, and each 
time the second rotor passes a specific letter or position, the third rotor turns one 
position. This 'turnover' position of a rotor was determined by the rotor's ring, a 
band around the circumference of the rotor, with the alphabet printed on it, which 
could be rotated around the wheel, and then locked in place. This allowed the 
encryptors to vary the position of turnover. [4, page 37] 
3.2.5 The Reflector 
After going through all the rotors, the current passes through the reflector, or 
reversing drum. The reflector was a stationary drum that, like the rotors, had 26 
connections on one side, but instead of sending the current through to the other 
side, it was output back through the same side. This was accomplished by attaching 
the wiring from one contact to another on the same side, effectively reversing the 
flow of the current (see Figure B.3 on page 74). The current would then follow a 
path back through the machine to the lampboard. This reversing action allowed 
the same machine to be used for encryption and decryption of messages, as each 
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letter followed a sort of 'symmetric' path. [4, page 37-38] This, combined with the 
fact that the rotors were traversed once in either direction, meant that, if the rotors 
did not rotate, or if we were always looking at the same point of their rotation from 
a given starting point, the action of the Enigma machine could be represented by 
a permutation that was a product of thirteen disjoint transpositions. 
Chapter 4 
The Solution 
4.1 Daily Key 
The daily key was a document received by the Enigma cipher clerks, on a monthly 
basis, that dictated the settings of the Enigma machine. These settings, at different 
times during and before the war, were changed at various intervals, sometimes more 
than once a day, and sometimes less. The name "daily key" was maintained as 
this was the most common interval of change. These settings were the plugboard 
settings, the choice of rotors, their initial positions and orders, and the ring settings 
on the rotors. 
23 
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4.2 Message Key 
4.2.1 What Was It 
24 
The message key was the six character prefix sent with any Enigma communication. 
It consisted of two successive encryptions of a sequence of three letters, chosen by 
the Enigma operator. The encryption of these letters was performed with the 
Enigma machine starting at the initial daily settings. The sequence was encrytped 
twice so that any mistakes during transmission might be found. For the Germans, 
the message key was how each cipher clerk let the intended message recipient know 
how the rotor positions were to be changed from the initial daily settings at the 
start of the message body. This change was necessary to make the Enigma code 
more than a complicated substitution cipher that changed daily, but that would be 
relatively simple to solve each day [5, page 251]. To the Polish, the message key 
was one of the most important secrets of the Enigma cipher. 
4.2.2 Mistakes 
Each day, the operators were given rotor settings and orders in the daily key, but 
the actual positions of the rotors at the beginning of the message was left to their 
discretion. This meant that, at least at the start of the Enigma's use, some very 
obvious keys were chosen. These included strings such as 'aaa' and 'qwe' (the 
first three letters on the German keyboard) as well as many other patterns, both 
alphabetic, and having to do with the position of the letters on the keyboard. As 
Rejewski and the others were by this time experienced cryptographers, they were 
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well aware of the human inclination for making 'random' selections in some kind of 
pattern, and were able to use this to guess likely combinations of letters. As at least 
one of the German operators was likely to make one of these choices on any given 
day, all the decrypters had to do was match it to the message. Thus this inability 
of humans to do anything completely randomly was one of the factors that led to 
the solution of the Enigma. 
Another such factor was something that the Germans thought would make the 
solution more difficult: the double encrypting of the message key. Ironically, this 
double encipherment led almost directly to the solution of the rotor connections, 
and, additionally, was unable to stop the message keys from being solved [5, page 
254]. 
4.2.3 How it was Used in the Solution 
The three letters sent encoded at the beginning of each coded message led to one 
of the significant breaks in the Enigma solution. They were able to use the fact 
that the three letters were encoded twice to find permutations of the letters of the 
alphabet that helped them to find the configuration of the rotors. We shall see that 
these permutations represented the actions of the Enigma machine starting at the 
daily setting, and that they were products of thirteen disjoint transpositions (see 
Section 3.2.5 on page 21). For simplicity of notation, we'll call these permutations 
A, B, C, D, E, and F. Also note that throughout this paper, a product of permuta­
tions will be viewed as a composition of functions. That is, we start from the left 
to the right when looking at a product of permutations. 
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On any given day, there could be hundreds of messages sent, many of them inter­
cepted by the Poles. Once it was discovered what the first six letters were, the next 
step was collecting enough of these preambles to find complete permutations. For 
example, a set of preambles might be 
ajk gdi 
grt pen 
psb ekf 
eso ahf 
From this small example, we take the first letter of each of the blocks of three letters 
in the first line, the a and the g. Then we would look for a preamble starting with 
g. From that we would get a p in the second block. Continuing, we get e and a
again. This gives the cycle (agpe), which is part of the product AD. Continuing in 
this fashion, with the first and fourth letters of other permutations, gives us all of 
AD. The second and fifth letters give us BE, and the third and sixth, CF. 
The small example given is very artificial. In practice, there would have to be sixty 
or more preambles (and thus the same number of messages) to complete all of the 
permutations. All of these messages would have to be collected on the same day, in 
order to have the same Enigma settings to work with. This requirement was just 
one more thing that made the solution of the Enigma difficult. 
In all cases, this process gave permutations that contained cycles of equal length 
in pairs. That is, there were an even number of any length cycle that appeared in 
the permutation. The following theorem and its proof will explain why. 
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Theorem 4.1 Let G be the set of all elements g E S2n such that g is a product
of n disjoint transpositions. Let a E S2n- The equation XY = a, X, Y E G has a
solution if and only if the cycle decomposition of a has an even number of ( disjoint)
cycles of each order. 
If a has 2m; i-cycles so that
then the number of solutions is 
2n = Li·2m;, 
i=l 
rrn im; • ((2m;)!) 
m·!·2mi 
i=l t 
Proof: Consider X, Y E G, both with cycle decompositions composed entirely of 
disjoint transpositions. 
Look at the element a1 , and take its transposition in X, say ( a1 , b1). 
Then take the transposition (b1, a2) in Y, which must exist since Y only has trans­
positions, and all 2n elements possible must be in one of them. 
If a2 = a1 , then X contains (a1, b1) and Y contains (b1 , a2) = (b1 , a1 ). Since all 
transpositions in X and Y are disjoint, this is the only occurrence of a1 and b1 in 
X and Y. Thus XY = a would produce a1 --t b1 --t a1 and b1 --t a1 --t b1 , which 
gives (ai)(bi) in XY = a, a pair of 1-cycles. 
At this point in the process, having placed a1 and b1 in their cycle pair, we must 
choose a new starting element, one not equal to either a1 or b1, and begin again. 
n 
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If a2 =J a1, then take (a2 , b2 ) in X, which must exist as above. If b2 = b1, then we 
have ( a1, bi ) in X and (a2, b2) = (a2, b1) also in X, which contradicts our assump­
tion of disjoint transpositions. 
Then take (b2 , a3 ) in Y. Again, this must exist. 
If a3 = a2 then we have (b2, a3) = (b2, a2) in Y and (b1 , a2) in Y, which contradicts
the disjoint transpositions assumption. 
If aa = a1, we have (b2, aa) = (b2, ai), and (b1, a2) in Y, and (a1, b1 ) and (a2, b2) in 
X, which gives us b2-+ a1-+ b1 and a2-+ b1-+ a1 , so we have (b2, bi ) and (a2, ai ) 
in XY = a, a pair of 2-cycles. Using the ( a2, b2) transposition in this process in­
stead of (a1 , b1) gives us the same result. 
If a2 =J a1 , we continue the process as above, each time adding new elements until 
we find one repeated, ie ak = a1. This must happen, as all 2n elements in X are in 
some cycle (transposition) in Y. 
Then (a1, a2, ... , ak-d and (b1, bk-1, ... , b2) are in a. 
Note that in each case two disjoint cycles of the same length are produced. 
If the same procedure is repeated on the remaining elements, more pairs of disjoint 
cycles are produced, as no cycle could contain one of the already used elements. 
Thus, if X and Y are as given, an a of the required form is produced. 
Now take a such that it is a product of an even number of cycles of each order. 
Consider k-cycles, of which there are 2mk. 
Take two of these, say (a1,a2, ... ,ak ) and (b1,b2, ... , bk)- Pair these as (a1,b1), 
(a2, b2), ... , (ak-1,bk-1), (ak,bk) in X and (b1,a2), (b2,aa), ... , (bk-i,ak), (bk,ai) 
in Y. This is like writing one permutation above the other, and pairing the elements 
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vertically. Then, as above, the product of these gives (a1 , a2 , •.• , ak)(b1 , b2 , ••. , bk). 
Continuing this method on each remaining pair of like-ordered cycles we get a so-
lution (X, Y). 
Thus the first part of the theorem is proved. 
Again, consider k-cycles. There are 2mk of these. Thus, there are 
ways to choose one pair, 
for the next, and so on. Therefore, we have 
( (2mk)! ) ( (2mk - 2)! ) ( 4! ) ( 2! ) 2!(2mk - 2)! 2!(2mk - 4)! · · · 2!2! 0!2! 
(2mk)! 
-(2!)m• 
ordered pairs of k-cycles. To look at unordered pairs we need to divide by mk!, the 
number of permutations of each set of pairs. Thus we have 
ways to choose the pairs. 
(2mk)! 
mk!2m• 
Finally, we can pair the elements of these k-cycles in k different ways for each of 
the mk pairs. 
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Thus we have 
km•(2mk)! 
mk!2m• 
ways to make 2-cycles of the k-cycles. 
Finally, taking the product over all cycles, we have 
rrn im' · {2m,)! m·!-2m, 
i=l i 
solutions to XY = a. 
30 
• 
From this theorem, we can see that AD, BE and CF are products of two permuta-
tions, each written as a product of only disjoint transpositions. These are our A, 
B, ... , F. The proof also tells us how to find A, B, ... , F, by pairing the elements 
of pairs of equal length cycles. 
4.2.4 Analysis of Theorem 4.1 
We can see from this theorem that, while we know how many solutions there are 
to XY = a, this number is not always small, or even reasonable. In fact, with only 
the 26 letters of the alphabet, there can be a huge number of solutions, sometimes 
billions of them (see Table A.l). What we need to know is how often this number 
is small enough to be useful. To find this out, we need to look at the individual 
cycle decompositions of our permutations, AD, BE, and CF. 
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First we need to look at the possible types of cycle decompositions of a E S26 . There 
are 101 of these. We then need to take a particular type of cycle decomposition, 
and find out how many of these there are. Since our permutations are composed 
of disjoint cycles, each cycle length appearing in an even number, we can come up 
with a formula for the number of possibilities. The formula for this is: 
(2n)! 
rr~=l ( i2m; • (2m,) !) . 
Finally, we need to calculate the number of solutions for each of the possible cycle 
decompositions, using the formula given in the theorem, 
IIn im; • (2m.!). m·'·2m; i;;;;l 'J" 
This data is collected in Table A.1 on page 63. 
Using the values in Table A.1, we can see that there are a total of 2, 927, 671, 
399, 386, 587, 378, 671, 616 possible permutations of the type we require. We now 
want to look at how often there are a small number of solutions to the equation. 
Table A.2 on page 69 gives these values. We can see that in most cases there will 
be very few solutions. In 96% of the cases, there will be less than fifty possible 
solutions for A. This means that most of the time, there were very few cases to 
look at to find the correct one, and that it would very seldom have been impossible 
to test all of the possible solutions, even given that that there was no access to 
computers. 
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4.2.5 Finding the Right Solution 
Now that we've discovered that we would usually have a small number of solutions, 
we need to discover which of these solutions is the correct one. To do this, we use 
the known foibles of the encryptors, mentioned earlier, such as using keys like 'aaa' 
and 'qwe'. This was not always possible given the message data on a given day, but 
an example will demonstrate how it could have been done. The following example 
was taken from [1]. 
For a given day, we collect the message keys (see Table A.3 on page 69). From this 
table, we can see that there are four keys that have been repeated: AHY OHU, 
KTR YZH, RHO KHE, and RPS KGO. Since the German message encoders were 
more likely to use alphabetic or keyboard sequences than any other sequence, we 
can assume that these represent such sequences. We also need to calculate the three 
permutations AD, BE, and CF. These are: 
AD= (XUFBV)(CMST J)(AOQ)(RKY)(DG)(EH)(LZ)(PW)(l)(N) 
BE= (UQNAJPGVIWCY)(FTZLKEXDRMOB)(H)(S) 
CF= (CYUVBXD)(EFPGTSO)(HWIR)(JQZL)(AN)(MK) 
The two pairs of I-cycles tell us that in the message keys, an I or N in the first 
position must decipher to the other, and in the second position, an H or S must 
decipher to the other. Not much of this information is useful, except that H deci-
phers to S. Thus AHY and RHO come from ?S? (where'?' represents an unknown 
letter). From the alphabet, we have RST, and from the keyboard, we have WSX, 
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ASD, and ESZ, as well as the reverses of these as possible keys. If we look again at 
the permutation AD, we see that Rand A come from 3-cycl~s, which we can match 
up in the following way: 
(AOQ) 
(RYK) 
This gives us the possibility that A deciphers to R and R deciphers to A, which in 
turn gives RHO into AS? and AHY into RS?. Looking back at our possible keys, 
we see that probably RHO deciphers to ASD and AHY deciphers to RST. This 
allows us to match up the 7-cycles in CF in the following way: 
(CYUVBXD) 
(STGPFEO) 
Using the previous information, we can take RPS to A ?C, which is likely to be 
ABC, and thus we have: 
(PGVIWCYUQNAJ) 
(BFTZLKEXDRMOB) 
in BE. Finally, we can decipher KTR to QA?, which is likely QAZ, and thus we 
get: 
(RHWI) 
(ZLJQ) 
in CF. This gives us most of the matchings for the theorem, and from here, we 
should be able to use the rest of the message keys to find the complete matchups. 
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In this way, we can use the message keys to find the exact permutations A,B, ... , 
F. You can see that this example is very artificial. However, on a normal day there 
could be many more messages, and thus more message keys to work with. This 
gave them more chances of finding repeated keys, and more chances to get keys 
that gave them more information. This method also relied heavily on the mistakes 
made by the encryptors, but these mistakes did happen fairly often. They also, over 
time, came to 'know' the individual encryptors, and what their particular mistakes 
might be. 
4.3 Rotors 
4.3.1 The Basic Equations 
We now want to try to convert the action of the Enigma into algebraic equations, or 
operations in permutations. We want to take each part of the machine, the rotors, 
the plugboard, the reflector, etc., and give each a letter to represent its action. If 
we use the same letters as Rejewski, we have: 
(See Figure B.1 on page 72) 
S = plugboard 
L = rotor 3 
M = rotor 2 
N = rotor 1 
R = reflector 
H = entry drum 
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Thus the path of a message entry through the Enigma is: 
SH NM LRL- 1 M-1 N-1 H-1 s-1 
which represents its travel from the keyboard through the plugboard, the entry 
drum, the three rotors and the reversing drum, and back to the lampboard. 
Since the Enigma rotated the rotors to create the code, we must take this successive 
movement into consideration. Thus we must introduce a permutation in S26 , called 
P, into the equation to represent this rotation. We will, for now, only consider 
the rotation of the first rotor. This is because the second rotor only turns every 
twenty-six rotations of the first rotor, and thus for a series of six rotations, of the 
twenty-six starting points of the first rotor, only twenty-one of these will involve a 
change in the second rotor. The third rotor changes even less frequently. 
If we take our permutation A to be the basic or intitial permutation shown above, 
we have: 
A= SHPNP-1 MLRL-1 M-1pN-1 p-1H-1s-1 
B = SH P 2 NP- 2 M LRL- 1 M-1 P2 N-1 p-2 H-1 s-1 
F = SH P 6 N p-s M LRL-1 M-1 P6 N-1 p-6 H-1 s-1 
Now we want to solve these equations for N, M, L and R. 
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4.3.2 The First Rotor 
At first it was assumed that the entry drum of the military Enigma was the same 
as that of the commercial Enigma. Thus the permutation created by this drum was 
thought to be 
H = ( qwertzuioasdf ghjkpyxcvbnml) 
abcdef ghijklmnopqrstuvwx y z 
That is, the rotor took input in the order of the German keyboard, and produced 
output in alphabetical order. Although this assumption eventually proved to be 
false, much time and effort was lost in trying to solve the Enigma using it, and 
work was consequently almost abandoned. [5, page 255] 
Although this original assumption was false, we will assume that His known. At this 
time, the ninth of December, 1932, Rejewski was given a photocopy of two tables 
of daily keys for September and October 1932 [5, page 256]. Since these tables also 
gave the daily plugboard connections, the permutation S was now known for some 
of the data. Thus we can write 
A= SHPNP-1MLRL-1 M-1pN-1p-1H-1s-1 
as H- 1s-1ASH= PNP- 1QPN- 1p-1 
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where the left hand side is assumed to be known. Similarly, we have 
where again the left sides are assumed to be known. Since P is also a known 
permutation, we transfer the preceding and succeeding P's from the right hand 
side to the left hand side, giving 
p-1H-1s-1ASHP = NP-1QPN-1 
p-2 H-1s-1 BSHP2 = NP- 2 QP2 N- 1 
Finally, for simplicity, we shall rename the left hand side: 
U = NP-1QPN-1 
V = NP- 2 QP2N- 1 
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Now we want to look at these equations as successive products. Thus we have: 
UV= NP-1QPN- 1NP- 2QP2N- 1 
= NP- 1(QP- 1QP)PN-1 
VW = NP- 2QP2N- 1NP- 3 QP3N- 1 
= NP- 2 (QP- 1QP)P2N-1 
YZ = NP- 5 QP5N- 1NP-6 QP6 N- 1 
= NP- 5 (QP- 1QP)P5N- 1 • 
Now, substitution gives us: 
VW = NP- 1 N-1(UV)NPN- 1 
WX = NP- 1 N- 1(VW)NPN- 1 
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From this we can see that VW is transformed from UV by the N p-l N-1 . Our goal 
now is to solve for N p-1 N-1 . To do this, we need a theorem. 
Theorem 4.2 Let a,/3 E Sn. The equation Xax-1 = /3 has a solution XE Sn if 
and only if a and /3 have the same cycle decompositions. 
Suppose that a (and /3} is a product of m1 1-cycles, m2 2-cycles, ... , mn n-cycles 
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so that 
n 
n= Li·m,. 
i=l 
Then the number of solutions to X ax-1 = fl is 
n IT im' · (mi!) 
i=l 
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Proof: Suppose a and fl have the same cycle decompositions. That is, both have 
m1 I-cycles, m2 2-cycles, ... , mn n-cycles. 
Now take each k-cycle in a and map the first element of that k-cycle to an element 
of a k-cycle in fl. For the k-1 elements left in the chosen k-cycles, continue this 
process by mapping each subsequent element in the k-cycle in a to the subsequent 
element in the k-cycle in fl. Continue this for each cycle in a, not reusing any cycle 
in fl. 
ie. if a= (12)(34)(5678) and fl= (23)(45)(6781) the following are possible map-
pmgs: 
(: 2 3 4 5 6 7 :) X= 3 4 5 6 7 8 
~x= (: 2 3 4 5 6 7 :) 5 3 2 8 1 6 
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Then XaX- 1 (1) = Xa(S) = X(5) = 6 = ,8(1). 
In general, suppose a : i -, j and X : i -, p, j -, q. Then X ax-1 : p -, i -, j -, q. 
Now show .B: p-, q. Since X: i-, p (and therefore x-1 : i-, p) and a: i-, j, 
by construction, and since X: j-, q, we have .B: p-, q. Thus Xax- 1 = ,8. 
Therefore a and .B having the same cycle decomposition implies that a and .B are 
conjugate. 
Now suppose a and .B differ only by replacing elements in cycles, that is, are conju-
gate. Since no element can be used more than once to replace another, the cycles 
remain disjoint, and thus c, and .B have the same cycle decomposition. 
Proof of the second part: 
Leave a in the given order. How many permutations of .B are there that leave cycle 
groupings as they are in a? 
Starting with the 1-cycles, there are m 1 of them. Thus there are m 1! orders to write 
the cycles in, since all the cycles are disjoint. Finally, there is only on way to write 
each 1-cycle, so we have a total of m 1! ways to write the 1-cycles. 
Now we look at the 2-cycles, of which there are m 2 • Thus there are m 2! different 
orders to write the cycles in, since, again, all cycles are disjoint. There are 2 ways 
to write each cycle as each has two elements. Therefore there are 2m, ways to write 
the cycles, not counting order of cycles, which gives us a total of 2m2 , m 2 ! ways to 
write the 2-cycles. 
:Finally, look at the n-cycles. There are mn n-cycles, which can be written mn! 
different orders. There are n ways to write each cycle, and therefore there are nm" 
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ways to write each cycle, not counting order of cycles. This gives nm" · mn! ways 
to write the n-cycles. 
Thus our final i:esult is: 
- rrn ,;mj • m·' 
- i=l C, i.· 
• 
So we let UV = a, VW = f3 and N p-l N-1 = X. From the theorem we know 
that there are solutions for N p-1 N- 1 = X and we know how many solutions there 
are. We can find these solutions by subscribing UV above VW as in the theorem. 
If we do this in all possible ways, we get all the possible solutions. Doing this for 
the other combinations, VW and WX, ... , XY and YZ, gives us the other sets of 
solutions. If we compare these sets, we should find at least one solution common 
to all the solution sets (there will always be at least one solution as these solutions 
come from a real code). In fact, we will probably have only to check two of the 
solution sets to find the solution, as there will usually be only one element common 
to any two sets. This common solution is our desired value for N p- 1 N-1 = X. 
At this point, Rejewski's solution seemed to fall apart. Contrary to the theory, 
there were no matching solutions in the solution sets. This setback almost caused 
the work to be abandoned, until Rejewski's looked at his original assumptions. He 
soon realized that he had the entry drum permutation wrong, as it was the only 
unfounded guess he had made. When he made another hypothesis, that the entry 
drum was connected in alphabetical order, that is, H was the identity, the solution 
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was clear. 
Now that we have a solution for N p-1 N-1 = X, we want to find N. This is done by 
subscribing Np-I N-1 below P, which we know, in all 26 possible ways ( as P, and 
therefore N p-1 N-1 , is a 26 cycle). This gives us all the ways that rotor N could 
be put in the machine. Each of the 26 solutions is correct for some setting, but it is 
difficult to know which is the "base case", the setting of the rotors that emerge in 
practice only when the rotors are put in the machine with identical settings. What 
could be done, however, was to choose one of the solutions to be our base case, and 
to adjust the interpretation of any given settings accordingly. 
4.3.3 Analysis of Theorem 4.2 
We know that there are a finite number of solutions, and we know that one of 
them must be in all the solution sets, and thus must be the correct solution. The 
important questions is, how many solutions are we finding and comparing? To 
discover this, we must analyze the values given by this theorem, much as we did 
those we found in Theorem 4.1. 
In this case, there are 2436 different cycle decompositions of permutations of 26 
elements. Therefore, we will not create a table of all of the values, but merely pick 
out some values that give us a good idea of what we are looking at. There are a 
total of about .4032914611 . 1027 permutations of 26 elements. The numbers and 
percentages of these with numbers of solutions less than some specific values are 
given in Table A.4 on page 70. 
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From Table A.4 we can see that the results for Theorem 4.2 are not as good as 
for Theorem 4.1. However, not as much analysis needs to be done with these 
numbers. All we need to do is find two that are the same, not check each to 
see if they work. We can find all the solutions for the first equation, and then 
find the solutions to the second equation until we find a matching one. Thus, on 
average, we would have to find about 300 solutions to the first equation, and then 
find 150 (assuming a random distribution) solutions to the second equation. This 
second number could probably be lowered by looking at the structure of the second 
equation, and eliminating matchings that would not be similar to anything found 
in the first equation, although this might not reduce the total time taken. 
4.3.4 The Entry Drum 
At this point we want to look at something that came up earlier. Although Rejew-
ski finds the permutation of the entry drum by guessing, he does mention that it 
could have been discovered through deduction [5, page 258]. We want to show how 
this might have been possible. This method is similar to that of finding the first 
rotor, but much more complicated, as we know much less about the structure of 
the machine at this point [2]. The only parts we can assume that we know are the 
plugboard, the positions (not configurations) of the rotors and the permutations A, 
B, ... ,F. 
We start by assuming that the first rotor is the same rotor starting at the same 
position throughout our analysis, but that the other two rotors have different con-
figurations, X and Y, that don't change with the rotation of the first rotor. Thus 
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we are using data from two different days. We will call the position the first rotor 
starts in the base position, and incorporate this into the permutation N so that we 
don't have to use extra notation. Finally, we know the plugboard configuration. 
Thus we can write: 
and 
K1 = s-1AS = HPNP-1XPN-1 p-1H-1 
K 2 = s-1 BS= HP2 NP-2 XP2 N-1 p-2 H-1 
K 6 = s-1 FS = HP6 NP-6XP 6 N-1 p-0 H-1 
K; = s-1 AS= HP NP-1Y P N-1 p-1 H-1 
K; = 5-1 BS = H p2 N p-2y p2 N-1 p-2 H-1 
where K, are known and X; and Yi represent the current positions of the middle 
rotors and the reversing drum. 
We can then take products of the equations K, and K,*, to get: 
K1K; = HPNP-1XPN-1P-1H-1HPNP-1YPN-1P- 1H-1 
= HPNP- 1XYPN-1P- 1H- 1 
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K2K; = H p2 N p-2 X p2 N-1 p-2 H-1 H p2 N p-2y p2 N-1 p-2 H-1 
= H p2 N p-2 XY p2 N-1 p-2 H-1 
KaK; = H pa Np-a X pa N-1 p-a H-1 H pa N p-ay pa N-1 p-a H-1 
= H pa Np-a XY pa N-1 p-a H-1 
If we now rearrange the equations to isolate XY, we get: 
XY = P N-1 p-1 H-1 K 1K{ HP N p-1 
XY = P2 N-1 p-2 H-1 K2K; H P2 N p-2 
We can now do some substitution: 
K2K; = H P2 N p-2 P N-1 p-i H-1 K 1K{ HP N p-1 P2 N-1 p-2 H-1 
= HP2NP-1 N- 1 p-1H-1 K 1 K{HPNPN- 1 p-2H-1 
= HP1 (PNP-1 N-1)p-1 H-1 K 1K;HP(NPN- 1 p-1)p-1 H-1 
KaK; = H pa Np-a ps N-1 p-s H-1 KsK; H ps Np-spa N-1 p-a H-1 
= H pa N p-1 N-1 p-s H-1 KsK; H ps Np N-1 p-a H-1 
= HP 5(P 1 NP-1 N-1)p-5 H-1 K 5 K;HP5(NPN- 1 p-1)p-5 H-1 
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Since we know the values of K,K[ for i = 1, 2, ... , 6 we can solve for 
using Theorem 4.2. 
At this point, we must assume that the size of the solution set for the above equation 
is relatively small so that we can work with all the solutions. We now want to isolate 
(P1 N p-1 N-1) 
by moving the surrounding permutations to the other side: 
We can then equate the permutations containing r, and r,+1: 
and isolate r,+1: 
Now we can solve for HP H-1 , using Theorem 4.2, as both r, and r,+1 are known. 
We take the solutions to these equations that are in all five solution sets, and get 
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a possible set of values for each ii!; in the equation: 
With these values, we can solve for H, as P is known, which gives us a set of 
solutions for H. Since P is a 26-cycle, HP H-1 is also a 26-cycle, and there are 
only 26 solutions, one of which must be the solution of the entry drum, and this 
one must appear in all 5 of the possible solutions sets. Thus we have deduced the 
configuration of the entry drum. 
4.3.5 The Second Rotor 
Given the solution to the first rotor, how were the solutions to the other two found? 
A couple of items made that easier to do. The Germans, in order to make the code 
harder to solve, had been changing the order of the rotors quarterly. Also, the data 
supplied to Rejewski had been for September and October 1932, a period bridging 
two quarters. Thus, for messages after the change, with a new rotor in the first 
spot, the same method could be applied again. 
4.3.6 The Last Rotor 
Now we have 26 choices for each of 2 rotors, and one rotor left to solve. At this point 
we deviate from the actual methods used by Rejewski. We use a more mathematical 
method than he did, or at least, than he specified. 
To solve the last rotor, we assume that in at least one of the months that data was 
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supplied for, the unknown rotor was the last rotor in the machine. In this case, we 
need to use the A permutation that we used for solving the first two rotors, but 
for several days, rather than all six permutations from one day. We also need to 
choose days in which the settings of the rotors follow an arithmetic progression. 
At this point, we can assume that in our usual equation for permutation A, that 
we know rotors N and M, and the settings of each of these rotors (from the daily 
key). We want to adjust this equation so that it is possible to permute each of the 
rotors. That is, we are no longer assuming that just the first rotor moves. Thus, 
our equation would look like this: 
A = 8 P"' N p-x PYM p-y pz £p-z RP' L-1 p-z PY M-1 p-y P"' N-1 p-x s-1 
Since we know the configuration of rotors M and N, and their settings, we can let 
J-1 = SP"'NP-"'PYMp-y 
and so we can write 
A= J-1 P' £p-z RP' L-1 p-z J 
which gives J AJ-1 = P' £p-z RP' L-1 p-• = U 
where the left hand side is known. 
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We now have 
where n represents a given set of settings of rotors N and M. We know what a 
chosen An does to input on a given day, and we know what J does to input, given 
that we know the settings on that day. To solve for Un, we need to find, among 
the daily settings given for the month the L rotor is third, are 4 settings for the L 
rotor in some arithmetic progression. 
To give an example to work through the method with, we will choose a progression 
of 3. So, given our starting value, z, for the permutation of rotor L, we have these 
equations: 
We now move the bracketing P's from the right side to the left side, as these are 
also known: 
p-zJ A J-1 pz = £p-z RP· L-1 
no no no 
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p-(z+9) J A J-1 pz+9 = £p-(z+9) RPz+9 L-1 
n9 fl9 n9 
Now we can rename the left hand side for simplicity: 
Next, we take products of successive W;'s: 
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And finally, substitute: 
i[Jai[Js = LP-3 L-1 (i[Joi[Ja)LP3 L-1 
i[Jsi[Jg = LP-3 L-1 (i[J3 i[J6 )LP3 L-1 
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Now, just as when we were solving for the other two rotors, we use Theorem ref-
prop:absoln to find £p-3 L-1 . Then we use the same method as before to solve 
for L, given that we know P and therefore p-3 • Finally, using the daily setting 
and our solutions to all 'three of the rotors, as well as "a sample of plain text and 
its authentic ciphergram at a stated daily key and message key" which had been 
supplied with the monthly tables of keys, the reversing drum was easy to discover. 
On a last note in the solution of the third rotor, we look at the question: can the 
value of the arithmetic progression be anything? No. If it is 13, for example, there 
are only two possible values to choose from: z and x+l3, as z+26=z. In this case, 
our analysis would not have been possible. While 2 has the same characteristic of 
13, that is, it divides 26, we are only dealing with 4 settings, while there are 13 
different values available from 2. However, in this kind of analysis, it is probably 
best to avoid numbers not relatively prime to the order of the permutation. 
4.4 Finding the Daily Key 
Now we want to figure out the other connections in the Enigma machine. That is, 
the particulars specified in the daily key: the plugboard, the rotor positions and 
orders, and the ring settings. These are the tools and information that we have 
CHAPTER 4. THE SOLUTION 52 
used until this time to find out the rotor configurations. Now, given the discovered 
configurations, we want to find the data that was known previously. 
We start by looking at the equations 
where 
A= SQ1s-1 
B = SQ2S- 1 
Q; = px; N p-x; pYi Af p-y; pz; Lp-z; RPz; L-1 p-z; pYi M-1 p-y; px; N-1 p-x; 
We then want to take products of these equations to get the permutations AD, BE, 
and CF: 
AD= SQ1s-1SQ4s-1 = SQ1Q4s-1 
BE= SQ2S-1SQ5S-1 = SQ2Q5S-1 
CF= SQas-1SQ6s-1 = SQaQGs-1 
We know that the permutations A, B, ... , F and their corresponding Q;'s have 
the same cycle decompositions, and that their products must also have the same 
decompositions. We also know that since they are composed of disjoint cycles of 
26 elements, there are 101 different possibilities for each decomposition. There are 
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three equations we are looking at, each with 101 possibilities, and thus 1013 = 
1,030,301 possible decomposition combinations for AD, BE, and CF. In addition, 
we know that there are 3! = 6 different orders for the three rotors, and 26 different 
positions for each of the three rotors, and thus 6 · 263 = 105,456 different complete 
settings for the rotors. Thus, there is an average ofless than 1 rotor setting for each 
cycle decomposition combination. While this does not mean that we have at most 
one rotor setting to test, it does suggest that we would not have to test very many, 
and that many of the decomposition combinations would not even be possible. 
Using this information, we want to make a catalogue of all rotor settings, filed 
by cycle decomposition combination. At the beginning of the Enigma's use, it 
was known that the plugboard switched exactly six letters and thus S and s-1 
consisted of six transpositions. It is also true that the plugboard did not change 
the cycle decomposition, just the individual permutations. Therefore, it would be 
quite simple to go through the catalogue and pick those permutations that differed 
from A by the switching of six letters. From these, it sufficed to try the given 
settings of rotors and inferred settings of the plugboard on the machine and see 
which gave intelligible output. Another factor that would help with this testing 
was the fact that most messages "began with the letters ANX from the word 'an' 
(German for 'to') and 'x' to separate the words." [5, page 261] This meant that in 
many cases as few as three letters would have to be checked. 
Thus, with a little bit of manual labour, a few calculations, and some luck, it 
was relatively easy to find the daily settings of the Enigma machine. This meant 
that the three Polish cryptographers could spend most of their time improving the 
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methods they already had, and finding new ways to deal with any changes made 
to the German methods. 
4.5 The German Changes 
As the Germans grew closer to starting their offensive, and as the subsequent 
war progressed, an increasing number of changes were made to the way messages 
were encoded on the Enigma machine. These changes meant that Rejewski was 
constantly working at solving the Enigma, and made all the cryptologists look for 
better and more efficient ways to find the daily key, decrypt messages, and keep up 
with all the changes. 
Until December 1st, 1936, there were always exactly six plugboard transpositions. 
After that time, this number changed to between five and eight transpositions. Not 
satisfied with the security afforded by this, the Germans increased the number to 
between seven and ten transpositions on January 1st, 1939 [5, page 268]. This 
change, however, can be easily dealt with using the catalogue method described 
in Section 4.4. They would still have to look up the permutation combinations, 
but instead of looking for a solution with exactly six switches, they would have to 
consider more of the choices. The catalogue method we describe is a combination of 
two methods we know the Polish used, their smaller catalogue and the cyclometer. 
Although not identical to either of these, it accomplishes essentially the same thing 
and works in a similar way, using the same mathematical principles and Enigma 
characteristics. 
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At the beginning, the rotor order was changed once a quarter. On February 1st, 
1936, the frequency of change increased to monthly, and eight months later, to 
daily. [5, page 262] This made knowing the rotor positions very important, and a 
method was devised to find this more quickly. This method was called the "clock 
method", and used "the unequal frequency of occurrence of letters in the German 
language" [5, page 262]. 
If we subscribe beneath each other, letter by letter, two texts in German, 
... , then within the compass of twenty-six letters, there will be, on average, 
two columns with identical letters, and this feature will be preserved, as well, 
when we encipher both texts with the same key. However, if we encipher 
each text using a different key to the machine cipher, then the twenty-six 
letters will include, on average, only one column with identical letters .... 
Within the compass of twenty-six letters, this phenomenon does not occur 
in a perceptible way, but when we have messages of say, two hundred sixty 
letters each, then in general we can tell by this procedure whether they were 
enciphered using the same or different keys. We make use of this in the 
following way: 
If we have a sufficient quantity of cipher material, we usually find between 
ten and twenty pairs of messages such that in each pair the first two letters 
of the keys are the same and only the third letters if the keys differ. We now 
subscribe the two messages of a pair beneath each other in such a way that the 
letters enciphered using the same setting of the drums will appear beneath 
each other. A priory, though, there are two possible ways of subscribing the 
messages beneath each other, depending on the position of drum N at which 
the rotation of the middle, the M, drum takes place. These positions are 
known and are different for each of the three drums .... It suffices, with each 
of the two possible ways of subscribing the messages beneath each other, 
to count the number of columns with identical letters, in order to find out 
which of the ways of subscribing the messages is the right one, and thereby 
to determine which of the three drums is at the right hand side. [5, pages 
262 - 263] 
This method was the only method that used characteristics of language, rather 
than of the Enigma machine. 
At the beginning, there were only three rotors to choose from, so it was necessary 
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merely to figure out in what order they were placed in the Enigma machine. Later, 
(on December 15th, 1938) however, this number was increased to five, although only 
three were actually used at any one time. This increased the number of possible 
rotor orders from six to sixty. To deal with this, the cryptologists had to find the 
configuration of the new rotors, and figure out which rotors were being used. They 
assumed that the first, or N, rotor, was a known rotor, that is, one of the original 
three. They also assumed that the other two rotors consisted of a known and an 
unknown rotor, and then proceeded exactly as had been done when solving for the 
third rotor. They would then be able to use a greatly expanded catalogue to find 
the daily keys. [5, page 268] 
On November 1, 1937, the Germans changed the reversing drum. Fortunately, they 
had discussed this change over the Enigma net prior to that day, so the Poles were 
prepared for it. Thus, all they had to do was solve the new reflector as they had 
done the previous one. 
Chapter 5 
The Spy: Was he really necessary? 
As mentioned in Section 2.3 on page 7, there is some controversy as to whether 
the data obtained from the spy, Asche, was really necessary to the solution of the 
Enigma. In this chapter, while we will not attempt to give a definitive answer, we 
will try to shed some light on some of the factors involved. 
One of the most significant factors in this decision is whether it would have been 
possible to find two days with the same rotor settings. To look at this possibility, 
we need to use the "birthday paradox", which says that in a group of 23 people, 
there is a 50% chance that two will have the same birthday. We tailor this to our 
situation using the following estimate, given in [6, page 237 - 238]. 
We start with an estimate of the probability of no collisions, that is, that no setting 
appears more than once in k days. We know that the choice on the first day is 
arbitrary. Given that there are n possible choices, the probability that there were 
no collisions by the second day is 1 - l, and 1 - k-l on the kth day. Thus our 
n n 
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estimate is 
( 1) ( 2) ( k 1) k-l ( ·) 1-; 1-; ... 1- ·: =[! 1-;;. 
When xis a small number, as ours is, we know that 1 - :c ~ e-x. The estimate is 
obtained from the first two terms of the series expansion: 
x2 x3 
e-x = 1 - :c + -, - -, ... · 2. 3. 
Thus we get 
k-1 ( . ) k-1 II i II -i -k(k-1) 1-- :::::; en =e " . 
i=l n i=l 
Now we have that the probability of at least one collision is 
-k(k-1) 
1- e " . 
If we want this probability to be e, we can solve for k as a function of n and e: 
-k(k-1) 
e n ~1-E 
-k(k - 1) ~ ln(l - e) 
n 
k2 - k ~ nln - 1-. 
1-E 
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Ignoring the -k term, we estimate 
We finally take e = 0.5 and our estimate is: 
k ~ 1.17\f'n. 
With our n = 6 · 263 , k is approximately 380. 
Thus, after 380 days, it would be reasonable to expect two days with the same 
rotor positions. The problem that arose at this point would be recognizing that 
two settings were the same, given only the encrypted data of the two days. The 
method of comparing frequencies of pairs of letters used previously would be of some 
help, but would not be a guarantee of identical settings. It would only eliminate 
settings that were probably not the same. Comparing the cycle decompositions 
would also help, and a combination of these two checks could give a fairly good 
estimate of when a match was found. 
Finally, given that we have found two days with identical settings, we must solve 
the equations: 
A; = S,H P N p-i M LRL-1 M-1 P N-1 p-1 H-1 s,-1 
B, = S;H P 2 N p-2 M LRL-1 M-1 P 2 N-1 p-2 H-1 s,-1 
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where i = 1,2, 6,.3 = HPiNP-iMLRL-1M-'PiN- 1P-iH-1 , and A,, B,, ... F, 
are known. Isolating the A;'s in one set of equations, we can write 
Then substituting for A3 we get 
tl, = S11 A,S, 
A2 = S11 B,S, 
A2 = S2S1' A,s,s;' 
B2 = S2S1' B,s,s;' 
Now, using Theorem 4.2, we can solve for S2S11 . 
At this point, we run into a problem: how to solve for S2 and S11 , and thus 
for S1 . At first glance, it looks like an application of Theorem 4.1, but upon 
closer inspection, we see that it cannot be. Theorem 4.1 requires that S2 and S11 
be products of disjoint transpositions. This is not, however, the case. Both are 
products of six disjoint transpositions, and fourteen I-cycles. Thus we have to look 
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for some other method. 
What other method might we use to solve this? For a group of 26 elements, there 
are 
possible such permutations, and without further analysis, there is no way to tell 
which would be the correct ones. It would also require further work to find out 
how many permutations S1 and S2 existed for each product so that it could be 
known that all had been found. Then testing would have to occur on each of these 
permutation combinations to find the rotor settings given that choice of permuta-
tions. With the limited resources available, this compounding of the task may have 
made the solution virtually impossible. If you also take into consideration that they 
probably did not know, without the spy's data, that there were six transpositions, 
this solution just grows more difficult. 
The other main barrier in the solution of the Enigma was the time factor. The 
Poles knew that invasion was relatively imminent, and they did not want to be 
wasting the time of one of their most valuable people on something that might not 
be possible to solve. Several times, even after the information was received from 
the spy, work was almost stopped on the Enigma. If Asche had never existed, the 
work would likely have ended in order to use Rejewski's time more profitably than 
on a seemingly unsolvable code. 
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Thus we can see that there were many roadblocks on the way to the solution. The 
chances of finding two days with the same rotor setting were very slim, and the 
difficulty recognizing such an occurrence only added to the problem. Solving the 
permutation equations would also have been difficult, especially having been made 
hundreds or thousands of times harder by having to try each of the possible plug-
board solutions. Finally, the time constraints would have made all of this even 
more impossible, particularly with out the aid of any sort of computing device. 
Today, it may not be so difficult, as programs could be written, and computer time 
dedicated to this solution, but with three, and sometimes only one man working 
on the problem, the obstacles were most likely insurmountable. 
Appendix A 
Tables 
Table A.l: Number of Possible Permutations and Solu-
tions for each Cycle Decomposition in Theorem 4.1 
Cycle Decomposition Permutations Solutions 
1, 12 700158786678134784000000 12 
13 1193170003333152768000000 13 
1, 2, 10 126028581602064261120000 20 
2, 11 208311705127378944000000 22 
1, 3, 9 69151485104013312000000 27 
3, 10 112025405868501565440000 30 
1,4, 8 49229914688306352000000 32 
1, 1, 11 69437235042459648000000 33 
1, 5, 7 41152189910878126080000 35 
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Cycle Decomposition Permutations Solutions 
4, 9 77795420742014976000000 36 
5, 8 63014290801032130560000 40 
6, 7 57155819320664064000000 42 
1, 2, 3, 7 14288954830166016000000 42 
2, 3, 8 21879962083691712000000 48 
1, 2, 4, 6 10939981041845856000000 48 
1, 1, 2, 9 12965903457002496000000 54 
2,4, 7 16075074183936768000000 56 
2, 5, 6 14003175733562695680000 60 
1, 3, 4, 5 7001587866781347840000 60 
3, 4, 6 9724427592751872000000 72 
1, 1, 3, 8 7293320694563904000000 72 
1, 1, 4, 7 5358358061312256000000 84 
1, 1, 5, 6 4667725244520898560000 90 
1, 2, 2, 8 4102492890692196000000 96 
1, 6, 6 6482951728501248000000 108 
2, 2, 9 6482951728501248000000 108 
1, 1, 2, 3, 6 1620737932125312000000 108 
1, 1, 2,A, 5 1312797725021502720000 120 
1, 1, 1, 10 2800635146712539136000 150 
1, 2, 5, 5 1680381088027523481600 150 
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Cycle Decomposition Permutations Solutions 
1, 3, 3, 6 1440655939666944000000 162 
1, 2, 2, 3, 5 583465655565112320000 180 
3, 3, 7 2116882197061632000000 189 
2, 2, 3, 6 810368966062656000000 216 
1, 2,3,3,4 405184483031328000000 216 
3, 5, 5 1493672078246687539200 255 
4,4, 5 1312797725021502720000 240 
2, 2, 4, 5 656398862510751360000 240 
1, 1, 1, 2, 8 546999052092292800000 240 
1, 1, 2, 2, 7 446529838442688000000 252 
2,3,3, 5 518636138280099840000 270 
2,3,4,4 455832543410244000000 288 
1, 1: 1, 3, 7 317532329559244800000 315 
1, 1, 1, 4, 6 243110689818796800000 360 
1, 1, 3, 3, 5 172878712760033280000 405 
1, 1, 3, 4, 4 151944181136748000000 432 
1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 4 75972090568374000000 432 
1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5 77795420742014976000 450 
1, 2, 2,J, 4 85468601889420750000 576 
1, 2, 2, 2, 6 60777672454699200000 720 
2, 2, 2, 7 89305967688537600000 840 
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Cycle Decomposition Permutations Solutions 
1, 1, 1, 1, 9 61742397414297600000 945 
1, 4, 4, 4 68374881511536600000 960 
1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 6 20259224151566400000 1080 
1, 1, 1, 5, 5 37341801956167188480 1125 
2, 2, 2, 3, 4 15194418113674800000 1440 
1, 1, 1, 2, 4, 4 11395813585256100000 1440 
1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 7 12757995384076800000 1470 
3, 3, 3, 4 24010932327782400000 1620 
1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 4 9004099622918400000 1620 
1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 5 7293320694563904000 1800 
1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 6 7717799676787200000 1890 
1, 1, 1, 1, 4, 5 6251417738197632000 2100 
1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3 4001822054630400000 2430 
1, 1, 1, ,1, 2, 3, 4 2170631159096400000 2520 
1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3 2251024905729600000 3240 
2, 2, 3, 3, 3 2000911027315200000 4860 
1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3 750341635243200000 4860 
1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 5 520951478183136000 6300 
1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4 610490013495862500 6720 
1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 4 379860452841870000 7200 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 8 868252463638560000 7560 
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Cycle Decomposition Permutations Solutions 
2, 2, 2, 2, 5 781427217274704000 8400 
1, 3, 3: 3, 3 762251819929600000 8505 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3 6029530997490000 90720 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 7 8591242682880000 72765 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 6 192944991919680000 11340 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 5 123484794828595200 14175 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 4, 4 18088592992470000 45360 
1, 1, 1, l, 3, 3, 3 19056295498240000 42525 
1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3 90442964962350000 15120 
1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 102776096548125 665280 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 6 64250746560000 810810 
1, 1, 1~ 1, l, 1, 2, 5 2104854457305600 103950 
1, 1, l, 1, 1, 1, 3, 4 1461704484240000 124740 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 4 9044296496235000 45360 
1, 1, 1, 1, l, 2, 3, 3 7146110811840000 51030 
1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3 12059061994980000 37800 
1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2 150738274937250 453600 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5 385504479360 10135125 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 4 18070522470000 1081080 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 3 2379657280000 3648645 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3 121808707020000 374220 
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Cycle Decomposition Permutations Solutions 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2 10767019638375 1587600 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 4 1968466500 137837700 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 3 133855722000 12162150 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2 100391791500 16216200 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3 9209200 1964187225 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2 164038875 413513100 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2 44850 27498621150 
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 1 7905853580625 
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Table A.2: Percent of Solution Numbers Within Given Bounds for XY = o: 
No. of Solutions No. Less Than Percent Less Than 
50 2813739736174304515200000 96.10845455 
100 2894931801899428949280000 98.88171886 
200 2919453261040612010937600 99. 71929439 
1000 2927504583673253964802800 99.99430213 
2000 2927649559078766757995280 99.99925401 
10000 2927670908460732334159780 99.99998323 
Table A.3: A Set of Message Keys 
AAT OJS JTZ CZL ROV KBB 
AHY OHU KIC YWY RPS KGO 
AHY OHU KTR YZH RPS KGO 
AUQ OQZ KTR YZH RQM KNK 
ASZ OLO LEA ZXN SGM TVK 
BKX VED LFB ZRX SVR TIH 
CFS MTO LFE ZTF sxo TDE 
CXP MDG LNI ZAR TGS JVO 
DJU GVP LUC ZQY THG JHT 
DUI GQR MPM SGK TLN JKA 
ECS HYO ONA QAN TLW JKI 
ETH HZW OPS QGO TMJ JOQ 
FHV BIW OSM QSK TOQ JBZ 
FVI BIR OXQ QDZ TOW JBI 
GVP DGB PDN WRA UOD FBC 
GZK DLM FIL WWJ WAL PJJ 
HVM EIK QDR ARH WWD FCC 
IVP IIG QYL AUJ XRQ UMZ 
JHD CHC RHO KHE ZHR LHH 
JSF CSP RHO KHE zws LCO 
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Table A.4: Percent of Solution Numbers Within Given Bounds for X ax-1 = /3 
No. of Solutions No. Less Than I Percent Less Than 
50 57213885045335786127360000 14.18673356 
100 87168883973322306355200000 21.61436390 
150 128081028367639780392960000 31. 75892394 
200 162158235504145766645760000 40.20869548 
286 201337467667480261877760000 49.92356326 
500 252872183691157601894400000 62. 70209218 
750· 292002335822630397468672000 72.404 79008 
1000 317150564622134895783936000 78.64053549 
2400 363358319973141502872576000 90.09819325 
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APPENDIX B. FIGURES 
Figure B.l: The Enigma Machine 
R L M N H 
Rotors: Reflector Rotor 3 Rotor 2 Rotor 1 Entry Drum 
QWERTZUIO 
ASDFGHJK 
P Y X C V B N M L 
Lampboard 
QWERTZUIO 
A s· D F G H J K 
P Y X C V B N M L 
Keyboard 
Q W~R T Z U I 0 
A S D F G H J K;-,;,----
p Y X CV B N1M L 
Plugboard (S) 
72 
APPENDIX B. FIGURES 
Figure B.2: A Rotor 
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Figure B.3: Inside the Reflector 
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